Masthead Logo

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Volume 18, Number 3 (October 1980)

Article 1

"There will be Wars and Rumours of Wars": A
Comparison of the Treatment of Defence and
Emergency Powers in the Federal Constitutions of
Australia and Canada
Christopher D. Gilbert

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Commons
Article

Citation Information
Gilbert, Christopher D.. ""There will be Wars and Rumours of Wars": A Comparison of the Treatment of Defence and Emergency
Powers in the Federal Constitutions of Australia and Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 18.3 (1980) : 307-335.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol18/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. 18

No. 3

October 1980

"THERE WILL BE WARS AND RUMOURS
OF WARS": A COMPARISON OF THE
TREATMENT OF DEFENCE AND
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS OF
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA
By

CHRISTOPHER D. GILBERT*

INTRODUCTION
As the decade of the eighties opens, the Western and Eastern blocs are
once again involved in rumours of wars, talk of extensive re-armament in
the NATO countries and a good deal of sabre-rattling. Canadian and Australian lawyers, along with their American counterparts, are thus faced with
the awesome prospect of possibly living in a war, or semi-war, situation. In
federations such as Canada and Australia, this means that the lawyer may
have to contemplate the system of constitutional jurisprudence that he serves
being "virtually engulfed by that mammoth among federal powers," 1 the defence and emergency power.
I.

Against this background of military and political uncertainty, it is timely
to review those aspects of the jurisprudence of the Canadian and Australian
constitutions that relate to the legislative powers of the respective national
parliaments to deal with war-time emergencies. Since the build-up to, and
@ Copyright, 1980, C. D. Gilbert.
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1 Murphy, The War Power of the Dominion (1952), 30 Can. B. Rev. 791, at 791.
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wind-down from, war and related emergencies are seldom clear-cut, but will
often involve transitional periods from peace to war and vice versa, this
paper also examines the capacity of the Canadian and Australian federal
parliaments to deal with emergencies that do not necessarily relate directly
to war or semi-war situations. War may be the ultimate in emergency, but in
these perilous economic and social times, emergency may sometimes wear a
decidely non-military aspect. Canadian and Australian parliamentary powers
to deal with non-military emergencies thus also feature in the following discussion.
II. DEFENCE AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY: THE TWO
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUNDS
It is the theme of this paper that, although the relevant provisions of the
Australian and Canadian federal constitutions are to some extent different,
the legislative powers of the two federal parliaments to deal with war crises
and related national emergencies are broadly similar. One brief, but by no
means insubstantial, caveat must be entered respecting this general statement:
the Canadian courts have interpreted the Canadian constitution so as to confer significantly greater emergency power upon the national parliament in
times of peace than have the Australian courts. Before this proposition is
examined in detail, the constitutional settings of the defence and emergency
powers in Australia and Canada must first be outlined. 2
Just as the Canadian federal constitution is contained in a British Imperial statute, the British North America Act, 1867,8 so too the Australian
federal constitution is contained in an Act of the Imperial Parliament, the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act.4 The Australian constitution is
generally similar to the Canadian, in that both instruments envisage a federal
form of government. Certain powers of "national" importance are given to a
central parliament and others of more "local" relevance are conferred upon
the provincial (or, in the case of Australia, state) legislatures.
The way in which legislative power is distributed in the two constitutions is very different, however, and this difference will be seen, in the course
of this discussion, to have certain important consequences. To begin with,
and perhaps most importantly, the Australian constitution differs from the
2

Apart from legislation, another source of emergency powers in both federations
(at least in a military context) is the war prerogative of the Crown. However, apart
from its traditional use in the declaring of war and the calling-out of the armed forces,
the prerogative has been little used in 20th century Canadian and Australian emergencies; both countries have almost exclusively preferred to base emergency action on
special enabling legislation. The war prerogative in Australia and Canada is vested exclusively in the federal Crown; for Australia, see Joseph v. Colonial Treasurer (1918),
25 C.L.R. 32, 24 A.L.R. 185, 35 W.N. 78 (H.C. of Aust.); for Canada, see ss. 15,
91(7) of the British North America Act 1867 (Imp.), and Marx, The Emergency Power
& Civil Liberties in Canada (1970), 16 McGill L.J. 39, at 51-56. This paper does not
deal with the prerogative, given the preference of Canadian and Australian parliaments
for using special emergency legislation.
3 30 & 31 Vic., c. 3, as am. (Imp.) [hereinafter the B.N.A. Act].
4 63 & 64 Vic., c. 12, as am. (Imp.) [hereinafter the Australian constitution].
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Canadian in that (with certain minor exceptions immaterial to this article) no
specific powers are granted to the Australian states. The only specific powers
granted to any polity are those granted to the Australian federal parliament.
This is done primarily by two sections: sections 51 and 52. The latter contains a list of four matters that are expressed to be "exclusive" to the Commonwealth parliament (as the Australian federal parliament is often known), 5
while section 51 confers thirty-nine Heads of Power upon the Commonwealth
parliament. These "section 51" Heads of Power are not expressed to be
exclusive to the Australian parliament, and it is now generally established
that the powers listed in section 52 and 51 are concurrent,6 although a valid
Commonwealth law will prevail in the event of conflict with a competing
state law.7 The "residue" of power left over after the Australian constitution
has granted specific powers to the Commonwealth parliament and government constitutes the legislative powers of the Australian states. The residual
nature of this power is expressly recognized and guaranteed by section 107
of the Australian constitution.8
Therefore, one must turn attention to those sections of the two constitutions that confer legislative power, either exclusive or concurrent, upon the
respective federal parliaments: section 51 of the Australian constitution9 and
section 91 of the B.N.A. Act. It is in these two provisions that one finds
respectively the major locations of the defence and emergency powers of the
Australian and Canadian federal parliaments.
In the Australian constitution, the legislative power respecting defence
is found in paragraph (vi) of section 51: a power to make laws with respect
to, "The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several
states, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the
Commonwealth." In its formal expression, the Australian defence power is
not clearly exclusive to the Commonwealth; none of the powers listed in
section 51 of the Australian constitution is. In spite of the general concurrency of most "section 51" powers, however, it is fairly clear that, at least in
its purely military aspect,'0 section 51(vi) of the Australian constitution was
intended by the framers of the constitution to be exclusive of the states. One
only need take into account section 114, which prohibits the states from
maintaining armed forces without Commonwealth consent; section 69, which
transfers to the Australian Commonwealth, inter alia, the old colonial de-

5See, e.g., Australian constitution, s. 1.
6See Lumb and Ryan, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated
(2d. ed. Sydney: Butterworths, 1977) at 71. Some of the "s. 51" list are, however, exclusive by their very nature, e.g., s. 51(iv), (xxx), (xxxi).
7 Australian constitution, s. 109.
8R. v. Phillips (1970), 125 C.L.R. 93 at 116, 44 A.L.J.R. 497 at 505 (H.C. of

Aust.).
9 For present purposes, the small "federal" list in s. 52 is largely irrelevant.
10 In relation to the question of the economic organization of the country during
war-time, it appears that the states do have a concurrent power with the Commonwealth
in this aspect of defence; see Carter v. Egg & Pulp Mkting. Bd., (1942), 66 C.L.R. 557,
[1943] A.L.R. 1, 16 A.L.J. 310 (H.C. of Aust.).
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partments of naval and military defence maintained by each of the Australian
states in pre-Federation days; and section 68 which constitutes the GovernorGeneral the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian armed forces.
Turning to the B.N.A. Act, one finds a similar intention on the part of
its framers to make the matter of defence an exclusive matter for the parliament of Canada. Thus, the seventh Head of section 91 confers upon the
federal parliament the power to make laws on all matters coming within the
classes of subjects of "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence,"
Furthermore, amongst the types of provincial public works and property
that were to vest in the federal government of Canada upon Confederation,
pursuant to section 108 and the third schedule of the B.N.A. Act, were:
military roads, armouries, drill sheds, military clothing, and munitions of
war. Also, section 15 vests the command-in-chief of all Canadian naval and
military forces in the Crown."
Despite the similarity of constitutional language, however, the course of
constitutional interpretation in Australia has located the Commonwealth's
defence and emergency powers primarily in section 51(vi) of the Australian
constitution, while the Canadian courts have rested those of the Canadian
parliament not primarily on section 91(7) of the B.N.A. Act, but on the
"federal general" or "peace, order, and good government" power in the
opening words of section 91.
The last major point of general comparison in Canadian and Australian
constitutional provisions to be considered before embarking on a more detailed survey of the law in both countries is the difference in structure of section 51 of the Australian constitution as compared with section 91 of the
B.N.A. Act. Section 51 commences thus: "The Parliament shall, subject to
this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to: .. ." The thirty-nine

heads of enumerated subject-matter follow, of which defence is the sixth head
or paragraph. In other words, section 51 confers no legislative powers other
than those comprising the thirty-nine headings. Compare this with the preamble of section 91 of the B.N.A. Act:
It shall be lawful for the [Canadian parliament] to make Laws for the Peace,
Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming
within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures
of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality
of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that [notwithstanding
anything in this Act] the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of
Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated;...

Then are enumerated the thirty-one heads of legislative power in the remainder of section 91. In contradistinction to the Australian constitution's
section 51, it is quite clear that the thirty-one heads of power in 91 are not

"In view of the constitutional conventions (common to both Australia and
Canada) concerning the monarchy and the office of Governor-General, the difference
between this provision and s. 68 of the Australian constitution is one of mere form.
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intended to exhaust the disposition of power effected by the section; the
thirty-one heads are in addition to a separate power included in the preamble. 12 That this difference in the structures of the Australian section 51
and the Canadian section 91 results in the Canadian parliament's possessing a
legislative power in addition to the enumerated heads of section 91 (a type
of power not granted to the Australian parliament by section 51) was recognized as long ago as 1914, by comments of the Privy Council in a case on
appeal from the High Court of Australia, A.G. for the Commonwealth of
Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.,' 3 in which Viscount Haldane
contrasted section 91 of the B.N.A. Act with section 51 of the Australian
constitution in much the same way as outlined here.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to re-plough the arguments as to the
limits and definition of the federal general power in section 91 of the B.N.A.
Act. The literature and case law on this point are sufficiently exhaustive
already. Whether one opts for the "gap" theory,' 4 or the "national dimensions" test,' 5 or the "discrete matter of inherent unity" approach,' 6 this much
seems to be settled about the scope of the power in the preamble to section
91: it does support federal laws aimed at dealing with a wide range of matters
that confront the nation in time of war and its immediate aftermath. These
matters are not restricted to questions purely military, but indeed embrace
much of the national economic organization necessary to modem warfare. 17
From the Australian point of view, section 51(vi) of the Australian constitution has played an almost identical role in war-time.' 8 The federal general
power in section 91 of the B.N.A. Act, however, has now been extended in
its constitutional reach to embrace a phenomenon that, in Australia, has so
far been beyond the ambit of section 51(vi), or any other section, of the
Australian constitution: federal legislation attempting to deal with national
crises that are in no way associated with military emergencies. 19
Attention is now turned to the various kinds of emergencies, military
12The author of the Report to the Canadian Senate of the Parliamentary Counsel
Relating to the British North America Act 1867, (O'Connor Report) (Ottawa: King's
Printer, 1939) would have violently disagreed with this appreciation of the office of the
preamble to s. 91. Nevertheless, Professor Hogg appears to be right in stating that, in
practice, the Canadian courts have adhered to a view similar to that advanced in the
text: see Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 244.
13 [1914] A.C. 237 at 253, 255, 17 C.L.R. 644 at 651-52, 653-54, 20 A.L.R. 22 at
26, 27 (P.C.).
14 E.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 at 116-17
(P.C.), also Hogg, supra note 12, at 245-46.
15 E.g., A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can. (Local Prohibition), [1896] A.C. 348, 5 Cart.
B.N.A. 295 (P.C.); A.G. Ont. v. Can. Temperance Fed'n., [1946] A.C. 193, [1946] 2
D.L.R. 1 (P.C.).
16
E.g., Lederman, Unity and Diversity in CanadianFederalism:Ideals and Methods
of Moderation (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 597; also the judgment of Beetz J. in Reference
Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452, 9 N.R. 541 [hereinafter
the Anti-Inflation Reference].
17 See Part IV of this paper, infra.

181d.
19 See Part VII of this paper, infra.
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and otherwise, that federal parliaments in Australia and Canada have attempted to deal with legislatively, and to how these attempts have fared,
constitutionally, in the courts'of the countries. The discussion that follows
is divided into five broad categories: defence laws in non-emergency times;
war as the supreme emergency; war's aftermath as an emergency; preparation
for apprehended war; and a type of emergency that may best be described
as "peace-time emergency."
III. DEFENCE LAWS IN NON-EMERGENCY TIMES
It is recognized in both Canada 20 and Australia 2 ' that, in times of what
may be called "profound" peace (no major war-clouds gathering on the
international horizon), the defence and emergency power at its narrowest
ambit embraces an ability to pass laws relating to the establishment, training,
equipment and general regulation of what might be called the traditional
military forces. In times of peace as well as war, therefore, federal legislative
competence inboth countries includes such traditional military matters as the
recruitment of personnel, voluntarily or by way of conscription; the erection
of forts, naval dockyards, airfields, military hospitals and the like; and the
manufacture or acquisition of munitions and weaponry.
In Australia, such laws on matters traditionally military are sometimes
said to be examples of the "primary aspect" 22 (the central or traditional
core) of the power in section 51 (vi) of the Australian constitution. An instructive example of this "primary aspect" in operation is the decision of the
High Court of Australia in A.G. for Victoria v. The Commonwealth of
Australia.m An Australian government clothing factory was established and
operated pursuant to Commonwealth defence legislation for the purpose of
making uniforms for armed forces personnel. After the First World War, with
the concomitant decrease in purely military work, the factory accepted orders
for non-military uniform clothing from bodies such as state police forces and
public municipal bodies. The factory continued production for military purposes as well. The factory's non-military work was objected to, because it
was allegedly not supported by any Commonwealth power under section
51 (vi) of the Australian constitution. The defendant Commonwealth argued
that it was within section 51 (vi) to keep a defence establishment at full
productive capacity by way of accepting some non-military work, because
the facility would retain full efficiency in case of an expanded future military
need. A majority of the Court accepted the Commonwealth's argument, holding that a certain amount of non-military work was reasonably incidental to
2

0 Murphy, supra note 1, at 797-98.

21 Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (5th ed. Sydney:

Law Book Co., 1976) at 202-203.
=The phrase is taken from the judgment of Fullagar J. in Australian Communist
Party v. Cth. (1950-51), 83 C.L.R. 1 at 254 (H.C. of Aust.).
23 (1935), 52 C.L.R. 533 (H.C. of Aust.) [hereinafter the Clothing Factory case].
Interestingly, Fullagar J. in the Australian Communist Party case, id. at 254, thought
the Clothing Factory case a "border-line example" of the Australian defence power's
primary aspect.
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maintaining the facility at full
efficiency, an objective that was clearly within
24
the ambit of section 51(vi).
The ambit of the "primary aspect" of section 51 (vi) in peace-time, however, cannot be pushed too far. By way of contrast with the Clothing Factory

case, an earlier High Court decision should be noted: Commonwealth of
Australia v. Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board.25 In this case, decided nine years before the Clothing Factory case, the defendant shipping
board conducted the business of owning, operating and repairing ships and

dockyards, pursuant to Commonwealth merchant shipping legislation. As
part of its normal business, the board contracted to supply electrical generating equipment to a non-Commonwealth-owned power station. This aspect of
the board's operations was objected to as being not authorized by the board's
constituting statute; even if it was, the statute was ultra vires any Commonwealth constitutional power, including section 51(vi). On the constitutional
point, the defendant urged the "efficiency" argument, similar to that which
was ultimately to be successful in the Clothing Factory case. In the Shipping
Board case, while all the Court held the board's commercial contracting
activities to be unauthorized by the board's statute, four out of the six justices
considered the section 51(vi) argument explicitly and rejected the defendant's submission. The following extract sums up the majority view: "Despite
the practical difficulties facing the Commonwealth in the maintenance of its
dockyard and works, the power of naval and military defence does not war2 4 Itmay be wondered why the Commonwealth was forced to justify the factory's
non-defence activities as being incidental to a valid federal defence purpose. After all,
if the Commonwealth chooses to expend part of its revenues upon the establishment
and operation of an undertaking that, inter alia, supplies goods to persons who voluntarily decide to* do business with that undertaking, then surely the "spending" and
"contracting" powers of the Commonwealth are a sufficient justification in themselves.
Unlike the apparent Canadian situation, however-see Hogg, supra note 12, at 68-72,
cases cited at 73n. 33-there is in Australia controversy about the federal contracting
and spending powers. It is unsettled as to whether the spending power (Australian
constitution, s. 81) is unlimited as to purpose and object, or limited to those areas of
responsibility allocated to the Commonwealth by the Australian constitution. The caselaw is highly equivocal on this point: see A.G. Vict. ex rel. Dale v. Cth. (1945), 71
C.L.R. 237, [1945] A.L.R. 435, 19 A.LJ. (H.C. of Aust.); Vict. v. Cth., (1975), 134
C.L.R. 338, 50 A.L.J.R. 157 (H.C. of Aust.). See also Lumb and Ryan, supra note 6,
at 288-92; Wynes, supra note 21, at 353-56. (The Commonwealth does possess, in s. 96
of the Australian constitution,, a power to make financial grants to the States on practically any terms, even those that lie beyond the Commonwealth's areas of constitutional
concern: see S. Aust. v. Cth. (First Uniform Tax case), .(1942), 65 C.L.R. 373, [1942]
A.L.R. 186, 16 A.LJ. 109 (H.C. of Aust.); Vict. v. Cth. (Second Uniform Tax case)
(1957), 99 C.L.R. 575 (H.C. of Aust.). Of course, s. 96 does not apply to the funding
of entities other than a State.) Similarly, in the Clothing Factory case, supra note 23,
the Commonwealth's contracting power would have been of doubtful value in upholding
the validity of the non-military transactions; it can be strongly argued that Australian
law prevents the Commonwealth executive from entering into contracts dealing with
matters ultra vires the Commonwealth: see Cth. v. Colonial Combing, Spinning and
Weaving Co. (the Wooltops case) (1921-22), 31 C.L.R. 421, 29 A.L.R. 138 (H.C. of
Aust.); Cth. v. Aust. Cth. Shipping Bd., infra note 25; Re K.L. Tractors Ltd. (1960-61),
106 C.L.R. 318, [1961] A.L.R. 410, 34 A.L.J.R. 481 (H.C. of Aust.). See also Lumb
and Ryan, op. cit., at 227-30; Wynes, op. cit., at 389n. 37.
25 (1976) 39 C.L.R. 1,[1927] A.L.R. 61 (H.C. of Aust.).
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rant these activities in the ordinary conditions of peace whatever be the position in time of war.... "26
In the Clothing Factory case, the majority of the High Court distinguished the Shipping Board case on the basis that the shipping board had not
been established primarily from a defence point of view. The board's statute
did not purport to deal with naval and military matters; it merely established
a government shipping line. The clothing factory had been established under
armed forces legislation; "the purpose of naval and military defence [had]
been impressed upon
the operations of the clothing factory from the very
'27
commencement.
Some commentators on these two decisions suggest that the difference
in the world situation between 1926 (the Shipping Board case) and 1935
(the Clothing Factory case) explains the High Court's more expansive view
of the ambit of section 51 (vi) of the Australian constitution in the latter case.
They point to the world's state of relative peace in 1926 and compare it with
the world scene in 1935 when Germany and Japan were behaving increasingly
aggressively and there was talk of a general war. 28 This might be so, although
there is no hint of any such factor being raised before, let alone being determined by, the Court in the Clothing Factory case. Another comment is perhaps on firmer ground with the suggestion that the Court in the Clothing
Factory case simply changed its mind about what was considered reasonably
incidental to the maintenance of defence forces in time of peace, and, in
effect, overruled the Shipping Board case. 29
Indeed, it would seem to be a reasonable view that an undoubted constitutional power to establish and maintain facilities for provisioning the
military should include a power to keep that facility's efficiency at a fair level
by means that do not unduly displace its basic "defence" nature. Yet it might
be persuasively argued that as the essentially military nature of the facility
becomes more like that of an ordinary business undertaking, it is more likely
that the means adopted to maintain the facility's viability will be unconstitutional, so far as the defence and emergency power in peace-time is concerned.20
In Canada it seems likely that Canadian federal legislative power over
the traditional military establishment, should be ascribed to section 91 (7) of
the B.N.A. Act, rather than to the general power in section 91.31 It probably
makes little practical difference which view is adopted; if nothing else, the
former view at least has the advantage of rescuing section 91 (7) from being
26 Id. at 9 (C.L.R.), 64 (A.L.R.).
27 Clothing Factory case, supra note 23, at 559 (C.L.R.), 251 (A.L.R.).
28
Lumb and Ryan, supra note 6, at 105.
" Sawer, Defence Power of the Commonwealth in Time of Peace (1952-54), 6
Res. Judicatae 214, at 217.
20 This point is developed in some detail by Derham, "The Defence Power," in
Else-Mitchell, ed., Essays on the Australian Constitution (2d. ed. Sydney: Law Book
Co., 1961) especially at 168-74.
3
1 Murphy, supra note 1,at 797-98.
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a complete dead letter in the Canadian constitution. One other advantage of
this view is that it emphasizes the special and extraordinary nature of the
emergency power included in the preamble to section 91. Section 91(7) is
Where one would expect to find the location of legislative power over the
traditional military establishment, while the extraordinary social and economic organizational powers inherent in the conduct of modem war by a major
industrial nation are more appropriately located under the special emergency
power that the courts have discovered in the opening phrases of section 91
of the B.N.A. Act.3 2
To the extent that the Canadian courts have considered section 91(7)
at all-and they have not often done so-the decided cases support this
suggested bifurcation of Canadian defence and emergency power between
section 91(7) and the general power in section 91. For instance, the power
to acquire land for military purposes was mentioned as a proper function for
section 91(7) in L'Union St. Jacques de Montrial v. Bglisle;33 the Canadian
parliament's power to constitute a "master and servant" relationship between
the Crown and a member of the Canadian armed forces, for tort law purposes, was ascribed to section 91(7) in A.G. Can. v. Nykorak;34 section
91(7) was also considered to be the source of the Canadian parliament's
power to pass legislation regulating the status of personnel in the American
armed forces stationed in Canada during World War lI;35 while the Canadian
parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over members of the Canadian defence
forces under section 91(7) was held, in R. v. Anderson,3 6 to be the major
reason for holding provincial driving licence laws inapplicable to a member
of the Canadian defence forces while driving a military vehicle on duty.
These cases relate quite obviously to matters concerning the administration of the traditional military establishment. Their ascription to section
91(7) of the B.N.A. Act, rather than to the general power in section 91,
seems eminently in accord with the scheme of sections 91 and 92. On the
other hand, Canadian federal legislation directed at the social and economic
organization of the nation during wartime-laws which would otherwise
clearly trespass upon provincial ground marked out in section 92-has always
been justified under the general power in section 91.
32

Id. at 798.
3 (1874) L.R. 6 P.C. 31 at 37.
S4 [1962] S.C.R. 331, 37 W.W.R. 660.
S5 Re Exemption of U.S. Forces from Canadian Criminal Law, [1943] S.C.R. 483,
[1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 80 C.C.C. 161.
S6 (1930), 39 Man. R. 84, [1930] 2 W.W.R. 595, 54 C.C.C. 321 (C.A.). By contrast, an almost identical situation in Australia resulted in the conviction of the soldierdriver: Pirrie v. McFarlane (1925), 36 C.L.R. 170, 31 A.L.R. 365 (H.C. of Aust.). In
Canada, however, provincial laws are sometimes applicable to soldiers, even on federally-owned military property: see R. v. Smith, [1942] O.W.N. 387, [1942] 3 D.L.R. 769,
78 C.C.C. 44 (C.A.), where provincial game laws were held applicable to a soldier on a
military reserve. In Australia, the laws of a continguous State do not apply to a Commonwealth military base, in the absence of Commonwealth laws applying and adopting
state laws: see Worthing v. Rowell & Muston Pty. Ltd. (1969-70), 123 C.L.R. 89, 44
A.L.J.R. 230 (H.C. of Aust.); R. v. Phillips (1970), 125 C.L.R. 93 (H.C. of Aust.).
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IV. WAR AS THE SUPREME EMERGENCY
In the Anti-Inflation Reference,37 Beetz I. of the Supreme Court of
Canada made an instructive comment, as applicable to Australia as it is to
Canada, on the effect of the emergency power of the Canadian parliament:
"in practice, the emergency operates as a partial and temporary alteration of
the distribution of powers between Parliament and the Provincial legislatures."13 8 This dictum, although made in the context of a "peace-time" emergency, is equally illustrative of the constitutional position in both Australia
and Canada in time of outright war.
In Canada, the emergency power of the parliament to regulate the social
and economic, as well as purely military, aspects of the nation's involvement
in total war has been located by the courts in the general power in the opening words of section 91 of the B.N.A. Act.39 In Australia, a war power sufficient to enable the Australian Commonwealth parliament to regulate almost
all social and economic aspects of modem war has been deduced by the High
Court from section 51 (vi) of the Australian constitution. It is thus correct
to say that, in both Australia and Canada, the defence and emergency powers
in both constitutions enable the respective federal parliaments and governments to largely, if not entirely, obliterate the distribution of powers between
central and regional legislatures in time of outright war.
The potential scope of section 51 (vi) of the Australian constitution in
time of war was measured as far back as 1916, when Commonwealth regulations fixing bread prices during World War I were attacked as being ultra
vires section 51 (vi), in the case of Farey v. Burvett.40 The basic argument
was that section 51 (vi) should be restricted to authorizing purely "naval and
military" laws, and that commodity pricing and regulation remained with the
Australian states, which would clearly be the peace-time position. A majority
of the High Court rejected this narrow construction of the section and held
that the defence power in the section was wide enough to embrace economic
and social regulation in wartime by the federal authorities, so long as such
regulation could be seen by the Court to have some capability to assist the
overall war effort.41 The control of basic commodities such as bread clearly
fell within such a test.
The Farey v. Burvelt approach to section 51 (vi) of the Australian constitution has prevailed ever since. 42 The approach involves an "elastic" concept of the defence and emergency power; the power will expand in wartime,
far beyond its ordinary peace-time application to matters purely military (the
3

7Supra note 16.
38Id. at 461 (S.C.R.), 527 (D.L.R.), 621 (N.R.).
39 See, e.g., Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Man. Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695,

[1923] 3 D.L.R. 629 (P.C.); Co-op. Comm. on Japanese Canadiansv. A.G. Can., [1947]

A.C. 87, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 (P.C.); Re the Validity of Wartime Leasehold Regulations, [1950] S.C.R. 124, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 1 [hereinafter the Wartime Leaseholds
reference].
40 (1916), 21 C.L.R. 433, 22 A.L.R. 201 (H.C. of Aust.).
41 Id. at 441-43, 455 (C.L.R.), 204-205, 210 (A.L.R.).
42
See Wynes, supra note 21, at 203-209.
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"primary aspect"), so that economic and social matters now inseparable
from the modem idea of total war are brought within its purview. This expanded, non-military aspect of the Australian defence and emergency power
is often called the "secondary aspect ' 43 of section 51 (vi). Thus, the ambit of
the power will be different from time to time, depending on the severity of
the military emergency facing Australia. 44 This elasticity, or varying applicability, of section 51 (vi) has been explained by a former Chief Justice of the
High Court of Australia45 as flowing from the fact that section 51 (vi) has as
its object, not a finite topic such as weights and measures,46 nor the regulation
of a recognized legal phenomenon such as divorce47 or bankruptcy, 48 nor the
control of specified human and commercial activity such as interstate and
overseas trade and commerce, 49 but a purpose. A purposive activity such as
defence will vary according to the military dangers, great or small, against
which the nation may need defence.
Consequently, during both World Wars, the Australian Commonwealth
parliament and government exercised legislative and executive powers little
different from those exercised by nations with unitary forms of government.
The mode of exercise of war-time emergency powers in Australia was similar
in both World Wars, and almost identical to that chosen by, inter alia, the
parliament of Canada during the same periods: the Commonwealth parliament passed statutes (in the First World War, the War Precautions Act
1914;50 in the Second World War, the National Security Act 1939r5) which
delegated to the Governor-General in Council power to make regulations
covering extremely wide areas of the country's economic, social and military
affairs, for the purpose of more effectively prosecuting the war. 52 During both
World Wars, but particularly the Second, numbers of these measures were
challenged.in the High Court as being ultra vires section 51(vi) of the Australian constitution; few challenges, however, were ever successful. A few examples indicate the extent of the Australian Commonwealth's regulation of
the national life: detention of suspected persons,53 price control, 54 manpower

437Tis phrase, too, is taken from the judgment of Fullagar J. in the Australian
Communist Party case: see supra note 22.
44
Andrews v. Howell (1941), 65 C.L.R. 255 at 278 (H.C. of Aust.).
4
5Stenhouse v. Coleman (1944), 69 C.L.R. 457 at 471 per Dixon J. (as he then
was) (H.C. of Aust.).
46
Australian constitution, s. 51 (xv).
47 Id., s. 51 (xxii).
48 ld., s. 5 1(xvii).
49

Id., s. 51(i).

5O (No. 10 of 1914) as am.
51 (No. 15 of 1939) as am.
52 Both Commonwealth statutes were repealed at the end of their respective wars.
The Canadian War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2, has remained on the Canadian
federal statute books ever since its enactment, in its original form, in 1914. At the time
of writing (February 1980), there is no Australian federal equivalent of the Canadian
War Measures Act in existence.
53 Lloyd v. Wallach (1915), 20 C.L.R. 299 (H.C. of Aust.).
54 Vict. Chamber of Mfrs. v. Cth. (1943), 67 C.L.R. 335 (H.C. of Aust.).
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of the sale of land and securities 6 and the control of rents
control, 55 control
57
and housing.
Although the Commonwealth exercised thoroughgoing control of the national war effort, not every federal control measure was upheld by the High
Court. The Court has emphasized on a number of occasions that the actual
efficacy of federal measures in conducing national defence is not for the
courts to decide; it is a matter exclusively for the federal parliament and executive government."5 But the Court has also maintained the view that, although not concerned with efficacy, Courts must always be satisfied that any
impugned measure exhibits some degree of capability to assist the war effort,
in order to be supported by section 51(vi). Infrequently, the Court has not
been so satisfied, and several federal controls were struck down by the Court
during World War H as not manifesting any tendency towards a capability
to assist national defence. Thus, for example, federal regulations controlling
the number of university admissions, without any accompanying diversion
into war work of the persons thereby excluded, were held invalid;5 9 controls
on artificial lighting applied inseverably to factories not engaged in war
production as well as those that were, were struck down; 6 while regulations
subjecting associations deemed subversive (in this case, the Jehovah's Witness
religious sect) to permanent dissolution and permanent confiscation of
property were invalidated as being too severe a way of dealing with an emergency situation. 61 (Presumably dissolution and confiscation for the war's
duration only would have been held valid.)
In view of the Australian experience, it comes as a notable contrast to
remark the Canadian situation. Apart from several minor instances, 2 judicial
exposition of the Canadian emergency power in war-time has usually occurred either in cases where federal legislation was invalidated because of the
absence of emergency, or in cases where the justifying emergency consisted
in the transitional period of war's aftermath.4 Nevertheless, despite their numerical scarcity, the Canadian cases reveal a war power which, in its secondary or non-military aspect, is every bit as comprehensive as the Australian
one.
55
Reid v. Sinderberry (1944), 68 C.L.R. 504, [1944] A.L.R. 205, 18 A.L.J. 58
(H.C. of Aust.).
5
6Shrimpton v. Cth. (1945), 69 C.L.R. 613, [1945] A.L.R. 125, 19 A.L.J. 25 (H.C.
of Aust.).
57
Real Estate Inst. of N.S.W. v. Blair (1946), 73 C.L.R. 213, [1946] A.L.R. 499,
20 A.L.J. 261 (H.C. of Aust.).
5
8 E.g., supranote 22, at 199, 255.
5 9 R. v. Univ. of Sydney (1943), 67 C.L.R. 95, [1943] A.L.R. 227, 17 A.L.J. 103
(H.C. of Aust.).
' Vict. Chamber of Mfrs. v. Cth. (1943), 67 C.L.R. 413 (H.C. of Aust.).
61 Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v. Cth. (1943), 67 C.L.R. 116, [1943]
A.L.R. 193, 17 A.LJ. 134 (H.C. of Aust.).
62
E.g., Re Gray (1919), 57 S.C.R. 150, 42 D.L.R. 1, [1918] 3 W.W.R. 111; Re the
Validity of Chemicals Regulations, [1943] S.C.R. 1, [1943] 1 D.L.R. 248, 79 C.C.C. 1.
63 E.g., Re Bd. of Commerce Act & Combines and Fair PricesAct, [1922] 1 A.C.
191, 60 D.L.R. 513, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 20 (P.C.).
64
E.g., the Port Frances case, supra note 39.
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The idea that the general power in section 91 of the B.N.A. Act comprehends federal incursion into areas of provincial jurisdiction during periods
of national emergency was first suggested in the Board of Commerce case.6 5
In a subsequent case, the Privy Council even framed a very early decision,
Russell v. The Queen, 6 in "national crisis" terms by suggesting that federal
temperance legislation applying nation-wide had been needed to combat
alcoholism in order to "protect the nation from disaster." 67 Though this suggestion has been rightly viewed with indignation, 68 hilarity6 and even as
being in plain error, 70 the concept of federal legislation properly invading
provincial jurisdiction during a national crisis took root.
In the Board of Commerce case, 71 the Privy Council struck down, as
invading provincial jurisdiction, federal legislation controlling unfair profits
and the hoarding of necessities. Their lordships stated that special circumstances, such as a great war, might well operate to bring within federal jurisdiction matters such as profits and hoarding. 72 The Privy Council, however,
specifically noted, inter alia, that the laws were not enacted during World War
I to meet special needs, but during peace-time. Furthermore, the legislation
was not limited to a temporary purpose or time, but was intended to be permanent.7 3 Similarly, in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider,74 the
Privy Council rejected, among several other arguments, the suggestion that a
national industrial emergency justified the invasion of provincial jurisdiction
occasioned by the federal Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. 75 Their lordships could not discover any factual basis leading to a conclusion that any
industrial emergency in Canada had brought about the federal legislation. 76
Yet, the Canadian parliament's power to enact in war-time the broadest
social and economic controls has been confirmed and illustrated in a trilogy
of cases involving either the temporary continuation as a transitional measure
after war's end of controls enacted during a war, or the institution of fresh
measures after war's end to deal with a war-created problem. In FortFrances
Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co.,77 the Privy Council upheld
federal price control measures that had been applied to paper during World
War I and temporarily continued after war's end. The Privy Council ex-

105Supranote 63.
16(1882), 7 App. Cas. 829, 2 Cart. B.N.A. 12 (P.C.).
67 Toronto Electric Comm'rs. v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 at 412, t1925] 2 D.L.R.

5 at 16.8

O See The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. .434 at 438,
[1925] 3 D.L.R. 1 at 6 per Anglin CJ.
09 See Marx, supra note 2, at 57n. 96.
See A.G. Ont. v. Can. Temperance Fed'n., supra note 15 at 205 (A.C.), 5 D.L.R.
Supra note 63.
72
Id. at 197 (A.C.), 516 (D.L.R.), 24 (W.W.R.).
70
71

.73

Id.

74 Supra note
75

67.
6 & 7 Edw. 7, c.20 (Can.).
7
B Supra note 67, at 414-16 (A.C.), 17-19 (D.L.R.).
77 Supranote 39.
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plicitly recognized that, in a great emergency such as war, the normal distribution of powers in sections 91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act is altered to allow the
national government to deal effectively with the emergency on a national
basis.78 In addition, the effects of that war or emergency may continue for
some time afterwards so that the national parliament and government is
permitted temporarily to continue war-time measures for the purpose of
ensuring an orderly return to peaceful conditions.79 In Co-Operative Committee on Japanese-Canadiansv. A.G. Can.,80 the Privy Council upheld as
valid, under the emergency power in section 91, deportation orders made against
certain persons of Japanese descent after the end of World War II. Their
lordships emphasized that, once parliament and the executive have determined
the existence of an emergency, the courts will be loathe to question whatever
measures the parliament deems necessary to cope with the crisis unless the
emergency has, as a matter of fact, either not arisen or ceased to exist. Even
in these cases, "very clear evidence" would be required before a court would
be justified in holding that the situation no longer warranted the national
parliament's emergency prescription. 8' Likewise, the Supreme Court of
Canada, following the Fort Frances and Japanese-Canadiansdecisions, upheld under the emergency power in section 91 the temporary continuation after the Second World War of federal restrictions on rentals for leasehold properties, even though such matters usually fall within provincial
jurisdiction. 82
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the power of the Canadian parliament
to enact, in war-time, the most thoroughgoing regime of economic and social
controls otherwise only permitted to the provinces is virtually limited only
by the duration and extent of the military emergency. In all events, Canadian
courts are constrained to accept the parliament's, or the executive's determination of the length and gravity of the situation unless very compelling
evidence of the absence or termination of any true crisis is forthcoming.
Certainly, during both world wars, and particularly the second one, Canadian
governments, exercising the almost limitless powers under the federal War
Measures Act, 3 controlled huge areas of the national economic, industrial
and social life virtually without constitutional question.
V.

WAR'S AFTERMATH AS AN EMERGENCY
The Canadian cases examined in the previous section of this paper
provide the answer to the question: Does the emergency power in Canada,
given its elastic nature, fade rapidly away when war or associated emergency
is over? The decisions in Fort Frances, Japanese-Canadians,and Wartime
Leasehold Regulations clearly demonstrate that in Canada the power of
parliament to deal with the military emergency does not evaporate the
Id. at 703-705 .(A.C.), 633-34 (D.L.R.).
634-37 (D.L.R.).
8
0 Supra note 39.
81 Id. at 101 (A.C.), 585 (D.L.R.).
82
Supra note 39.
83 R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2.
78

791d. at 706-708 (A.C.),
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moment the war ends. The concept of "emergency" legislation under the
general power of section 91 of the B.N.A. Act does include a power to nurse
the country through the transition from war to peace. This "convalescence"
may require that a selection of the war-time measures be continued in force
temporarily to assist an orderly transition to peace-time conditions. Since the
three cases just cited illustrate this fully, the situation in Canada needs no
further comment.
In Australia, the courts have likewise held that the power in section
51 (vi) of the Australian constitution embraces the ability to continue for a
time, beyond the close of hostilities, such war-time measures as may aid an
orderly passage from war to peace. In the years immediately following the
end of hostilities in World War II, a number of Australian Commonwealth
post-war economic controls were attacked as being ultra vires section 51 (vi)
of the Australian constitution. For example, in Dawson v. The Commonwealth,8 transitional measures continuing a requirement of federal Treasury
consent for land sales (normally within state jurisdiction) were attacked as
being no longer supportable under the defence power. The controls were
upheld. In Miller v. The Commonwealth,"5 the attack was levelled at federal
transitional measures maintaining the war-time federal controls on the sale
of corporate securities. Again, the controls were upheld. A number of other
examples could be given, but in general, the early post-Second World War
High Court decisions established, first, that the federal defence power did not
immediately decline to its normal peace-time level merely because the shooting war had stopped; and, second, that the defence power enabled the Commonwealth to continue temporarily selected war-time control measures in
the interests of orderly transition 86
The High Court, however, was not willing to accord the federal
parliament the same level of carte blanche in determining the appropriate
duration of transitional controls, as apparently the Canadian courts accorded
the Canadian parliament. The High Court warned that it would often be a
matter of degree as to when a federal transitional measure was legitimately
incidental to "winding down" the nation's war effort, or whether the measure
was merely one of general economic control, no longer particularly related to
the then recent war emergency, and thus ultra viressT The High Court was
clearly worried that, by allowing the Commonwealth too much latitude in
unilaterally deciding on the duration of "temporary" transitional economic
controls, the federal parliament was being given, in the shape of section
51 (vi), a "back door" method of upsetting the whole constitutional division
of legislative powers between Commonwealth and states. 88
(1946), 73 C.L.R. 157, [1946] A.L.R. 461, 20 A.L.J. 257 (H.C. of Aust.).
85 (1946), 73 C.L.R. 187, [1946] A.L.R. 469, 20 A.L.J. 253 (H.C. of Aust.).
80 For a useful survey of early post-World War II Australian federal "transitional"
legislation, and of the Australian High Court's initial treatment of the "transitional"
aspect of the defence power, see Else-Mitchell, Transitional and Post-War Powers in the
Commonwealth of Australia (1947), 25 Can. B. Rev. 854.
87 E.g., Australian Textiles Pty. Ltd. v. Cth. (1945), 71 C.L.R. 161 at 170 (H.C.
84

of Aust.).
88 E.g., R. v. Foster (1949), 79 C.L.R. 43-at 83 (H.C. of Aust.).
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The crunch came in 1949, four years after the end of the "hot" war,
when the High Court overturned three pieces of Commonwealth economic
control that had been maintained on an annual "temporary" basis since the
end of the war in the interests of orderly transition to peace. In the case of R.
v. Foster, 9 the High Court decided that continuance of war-time regulations
concerning women's employment, fuel rationing and certain types of housing
control (areas not normally within the Commonwealth's enumerated jurisdictions) was no longer justifiable under the "transitional" aspect of section
51(vi). The argument in favour of the measures' continued validity under
the "transitional" defence power was that the controls related to economic
problems that had been greatly exacerbated during the war, and that those
problems were still continuing. In rejecting this line of argument, the Court
said it was insufficient, for the purposes of justifiability under section 51 (vi),
that war-aggravated or war-caused economic problems had, by the time of
the litigation in question, become part of the general pattern of Australian
economic life. In the words of the Court:
The effects of the past war will continue for centuries. The war has produced or
contributed to changes in nearly every circumstance which affects the lives of
civilized people. If it were held that the defence power would justify any legislation at any time which dealt with any matter the character of which had been
changed by the war, or with any problem which had been created or aggravated
by the war, then the result would be that the Commonwealth Parliament would
have a general power of making laws for the peace, order and good government
of Australia with respect to almost every subject.00

It can thus be seen that, in relation to the "transitional" aspect of the
Australian defence power, the High Court was prepared to recognize that the
basic question was ultimately one of constitutional policy for the court to
decide, rather than one for the parliament. When does a post-war control
measure, not otherwise within federal competence, cease to be properly
incidental to a legitimate defence-transitional stage? This becomes an indefinite enquiry, in which factors of policy and administrative convenience
compete with legal rules that are, at best, fuzzy and conjectural. It is little
wonder that one commentator has described R. v. Foster as a pleasing
administrativestep by the High Court to "unwind" the defence power of the
Commonwealth after World War I.)'
Before leaving the field of war's aftermath and Australian and Canadian
federal powers to deal with its effects, some comments are in order as to
another area of activity that has engaged both federal polities in post-war
times: the passage of legislation facilitating the re-entry into civilian life of
former members of the fighting services. After both the First and Second
89 ld. R. v. Foster is actually a consolidation of three cases decided by the Australian High Court simultaneously: R. v. Foster itself; Wagner v. Gall; and Collins v.
Hunter. The Court delivered a single, unanimous judgment covering all three cases.
00 Supra note 88.
91
Sawer, The TransitionalDefence Power of the Commonwealth (1949), 23 Aust.
L.J. 255 at 255. For two other examples of High Court invalidation of post-World
War II Australian federal control measures, see: Queensland Newspapers Ply. Ltd. v.
McTavish (1957), 85 C.L.R. 30, [1951] A.L.R. 821, 25 A.L.J. 491 and Aberdare Collieries Pty. Ltd. v. Cth. (1952), 86 C.L.R. 12, [1952] A.L.R. 249, 26 A.L.J. 64.
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World Wars, federal parliaments in both Australia and Canada enacted
various laws providing benefits in one form or another to assist ex-servicemen
to re-establish themselves in civilian life. Sometimes the assistance took the
form of direct financial or material aid of many types; sometimes the assistance took the form of laws granting preference in employment to ex-servicemen. Generally, the laws applied only to the enacting parliament's own
agencies and civil service, though the ambit of some extended to all civilian
employers.
In both countries, such legislation is regarded as being appropriately
within federal jurisdiction: in Australia, under section 51 (vi) of the Australian constitution; in Canada, under either section 91 (7) of the B.N.A. Act,
or the general power in its emergency aspect, in the preamble of section 91.
There has been little consideration of the constitutionality of "re-establishment" legislation by the Canadian courts; the one or two lower courts that
have made passing reference to the matter seem to doubt that section 91 (7)
is the appropriate constitutional basis for such laws. Rather, they seem to
regard the re-absorption into civilian life of large numbers of ex-soldiers as
an aftermath of war that is appropriately dealt with under the emergency
power in section 91.92
In Australia, however, while the High Court has affirmed that section
51 (vi) of the Australian constitution provides the foundation for federal
"re-establishment" legislation, the Court has drawn a limit of some importance. The Court has recognized that the Commonwealth, in pursuance
of its jurisdiction under section 51 (vi), may expend its own treasure and
resources on the advancement of direct benefits to ex-servicemen without any
limits as to duration; 93 however, the matter is different when the Commonwealth attempts to alter, under colour of section 51(vi)-type legislation,
the normal rights and liabilities as between ex-servicemen and other members
of the general public. This may be done for a temporary period after war's
end with a view to re-settling large numbers of soldiers who have recently
been demobilized, 4 but once the country and population have been largely
returned to normal peace-time conditions, such federal laws lose any justification under section 51(vi). The analogy with R. v. Foster9 5 becomes
readily apparent. Accordingly, in IllawarraDistrict County Council v. Wickham,.9 6 the High Court struck down, as being far too remote from post-Second
World War transitional conditions, federal legislation that attempted to
extend to 1960 a 1945 Commonwealth provision giving Second World War
ex-servicemen and their dependants certain preferential employment rights

92 See Re Soldier Settlement Act and McManus, [1939] 2 W.W.R. 199 (D.C.

Sask.). In Fry v. W. H. Schwartz & Sons Ltd., [1951] 2 D.L.R. 198 (N.S.S.C.), the
Court considered that the Canadian Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act 1946 was
valid as "a defence measure"-the Court declined to say whether that validity rested on
s. 91(7) or the federal general power.
93
E.g., A.G. Cth. v. Balding (1920), 27 C.L.R. 395, 26 A.L.R. 85 (H.C. of Aust.).
94 See Wenn v. A.G. Vict. (1948), 77 C.L.R. 84 at 111 (H.C. of Aust.).
95 Supranote 88.
96 (1958-59), 101 C.L.R. 467 (H.C. of Aust.).
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vis-a-vis the rest of the general public. In the words of Windeyer J., section
51 (vi) does not allow the Commonwealth to create ex-servicemen "a
privileged class among civilians. 9 7
It can be seen, therefore, that in both Canada and Australia the defence
and emergency powers conferred upon the respective federal parliaments
enable the latter to invade substantially areas otherwise reserved to the
provinces and states, on the basis of regulating an orderly transition from
war conditions to peaee-time. The one major difference between the two
jurisdictions has been that, in Australia, the High Court has been prepared to
be far more assertive in telling the Commonwealth, in effect: "We, the court,
judge that you, the Commonwealth, have had long enough to restore the
country to peace-time conditions. You can no longer trespass upon state
jurisdictions by claiming the existence of 'transitional' conditions. We are the
ultimate constitutional arbiters, and we say - 'enough'." This is perhaps a
very free translation of decisions like R. v. Foster, but the contrast with the
Supreme Court of Canada's "we largely bow to parliamentary judgment in
these matters" attitude is nevertheless very marked.
VI. IS MERE APPREHENSION OF WAR A SUFFICIENT
EMERGENCY?
Though the constitutions (and the courts) of the federations have vested
a very wide power in the federal parliaments to trespass upon provincial and
state preserves, in the interests of war-time mobilization of national effort and
steering the nation through the difficult transitional waters from war to peace,
there remains another situation to be considered. If the federal government
perceives (rightly or wrongly) that the country may be soon involved in
international conflict and war, must it wait until the military crisis breaks
out in its full rigour before it can avail itself of the extraordinary emergency
and defence powers in the constitution to order the nation's affairs accordingly? Can it use those powers to prepare the nation's resources, economic
and material, as well as military, in advance of the coming struggle?
In both countries, there is a measure of latitude in the federal parliament's power to use defence and emergency powers in situations short of
outright war, but in which trouble seems to be brewing. The actual ability
to use the power during such times seems to be established. The question is:
how far, in pre-war situations, can the respective federal parliaments go, in
overriding the normal division of powers between central and regional
legislatures?
A survey of Canadian constitutional law reveals no cases decided
specifically on the topic. If one reasons by analogy with the judicial decisions
on the scope of the federal general power in situations of war, aftermath of
war, and "peace-time" emergencies, there seems little reason to doubt that
97

1d. at 503. His Honour could hardly be accused of lacking sympathy for exservicemen; he had served with the Australian Army in World War II, as a battalion
and brigade commander, with distinction.
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the Canadian parliament in all probability possesses a sizable power, even in
areas of usual provincial jurisdiction, to arrange the affairs of the country in
preparation for war if the national government is bona fide of opinion that
war is threatening. The Privy Council has upheld price controls 98 and deportation orders99 in the immediate aftermath of war, relying on the federal
general power in section 91 of the B.N.A. Act; the Supreme Court of Canada
has upheld under the same power federal leasehold regulations in the notquite-so-immediate aftermath of war; 1 0 and the latter has quite recently
upheld federal wage and price controls (usually very much in the provincial
domain pursuant to section 91 (13) of the B.N.A. Act) in a time of reasonably
profound world peace, under the general power in section 91, on the strength
of the federal parliament's assertion that there was an economic difficulty
(inflation) causing serious concern to the nation.' 0 ' It is hard to imagine that
the Supreme Court would question the Canadian parliament if, because of a
grave international atmosphere and threat of conflict, that parliament was
going to take preparatory measures, such as moves to mobilize the national
economy for potentially increased war production. It is suggested that the
proclamation of the Canadian War Measures Act 10 2 during such a period
would probably not be successfully challenged for want of constitutionality
in the Supreme Court of Canada. 103 The invocation of the War Measures Act
by the Canadian government in the "October Crisis" of 1970, in a time not
of war but apprehended internal revolt, 104 and without serious constitutional
challenge, 0 5 lends some support to this view.
In Australia, the federal parliament's power to invoke measures not normally sanctioned under section 51 of the Australian constitution, on the basis
of imminent rather than actual war, has been considered twice by the High
Court. In AustralianCommunist Party v. The Commonwealth,10 and Marcus
Clark & Co. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth107 the Court had to rule upon federal laws, normally incompetent to the Commonwealth under section 51, that
had been enacted during a period of grave international crisis (in this instance,
the Korean War, 1950-53) to help prepare the country for possible war. In

The Fort Francescase, supra note 39.
09 The Japanese-Canadianscase, supra note 39.
100
The Wartime Leasehold Regulations reference, supra note 39.
10 1 Anti-Inflation Reference, supra note 16.
1D2 R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2.
103 In the Anti-Inflation Reference, supra note 16, Beetz J. was explicitly prepared
to assume that the Canadian parliament might exercise its national emergency powers
in anticipation of an actual emergency: see op. cit. at 459 (S.C.R.), 525 (D.L.R.), 619
(N.R.).
104 For an account of the "October Crisis", and the Canadian government's response
98

thereto, see Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights (2d rev. ed. Toronto: McClelland

& Stewart, 1975) at 331-51.
105 A constitutional objection to the Act's invocation was, amongst a number of

other objections, rather brusquely rejected by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Gagnon &
Vallires v. Reg. (1971), 14 C.R.N.S. 321.
106 Supra note 22.
107 (1952), 87 C.L.R. 177 (H.C. of Aust.).
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both cases, the basic issue was the same: Would section 51 (vi) of the
Australian constitution, in its secondary (non-military) aspect, support federal
measures in a time short of outright war that would normally transgress the
federal-state division of powers, but were deemed necessary for national
security?
In the Communist Party case, a federal statute,10 8 after reciting certain
allegedly subversive and treasonable aims, doctrines and activities of the
Australian Communist Party, simply dissolved the party. The Act also provided that associations controlled by communists could be dissolved by
executive fiat if those associations were declared by the Governor-General to
be unlawful and a threat to national security. Also, certain civil disabilities
were imposed upon individual communists. It must be borne in mind that the
Act was passed several months after the outbreak of the Korean War, in which
Australian forces were participating as part of the United Nations force.
The trouble with the Act was that although the Commonwealth had full
powers to prohibit the alleged activities of the party, that is not what the Act
did: it simply dissolved the party. On its face, it was a law with respect to
unincorporated associations (over which the Commonwealth has no
control
under section 51), not a law with respect to treason and subversion. The only
link between the Act and the defence power was the Act's recitals evidencing
the federal parliament's opinion of the treasonable activities of the party.
The High Court, with only one dissent, struck down the Act. No one doubted
that the secondary aspect of section 51 (vi) might operate in a time of highly
disturbed world unrest,'0 9 but this was not such an occasion. The Court accepted that in a time of outright war the Act would be valid under, inter alia,
section 51(vi), but not in a time short of that.110 If the facts alleged against
the party had been objectively provable, so that the courts could see the
connection between the operation of the Act and section 51(vi), then the Act
might have been valid; but for parliament merely to recite in the Act that
the Communist Party was guilty of treasonable activities was to allow
parliament to usurp the constitutional function of the courts in finding
links between federal laws and heads of constitutional power on which to base
them. To allow probative force to the Act's recitals would be to say that
"Parliament could recite itself into a field which was closed to it.""" Apart
from adducing actual proof of the Act's allegations against the party, which
all but two of the Court refused to contemplate, the only other way of establishing the facts necessary for the Act's validity was by way of the device of
judicial notice. None of the majority was prepared to judicially notice any
notorious treasonable activity by the party, as distinct from its mere propagation of unpopular doctrines.
Three things probably spelt the constitutional doom of the Act: first, the

108 Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (No. 16 of 1950, Aust.).

Communist Party case, supra note 22 at 195, 254.
110 Id. at 197-98, 258-59, 266.

109 E.g.,

M Id. at 264.
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fact that Australia was clearly not involved in general war;11 2 second, the
fact that the federal parliament tried to arrogate to itself the function of
judging the constitutional validity of the Act, by way of the recitals;" i3 and
third, the qualms felt by at least some of the majority at this federal invasion
of civil liberty at a time when Australia was not embroiled in a general "hot"
war, as distinct from a purely limited conflict."14
Some months later, another chance arose, in the Capital Issues case,"15
to explore the ambit of the Australian defence power's "secondary aspect"
in a time short of general war. In 1951, the Australian Commonwealth parliament passed the Defence PreparationsAct"16 which, inter alia, authorized
regulations prohibiting corporations from raising capital without the federal
Treasurer's consent, which could be denied only on the ground that such
raising of capital was inimical to the country's defence preparations. The Act
included a number of recitals detailing the tense international situation (the
Chinese had by then intervened in Korea and there was a widespread belief
that a general war between the Western powers and the Soviet Bloc was imminent) and the need to implement certain economic mobilization measures
in Australia to prepare the economy for possible war. The regulations included
a provision that, if the Treasurer denied his permission, he could be compelled
to give his reasons in writing, and these were made admissible in court.
Marcus Clark & Co. wished to finance expansion of their business with a
share issue. They applied for federal permission, were refused, secured the
Treasurer's reasons in writing, then sued the Commonwealth, alleging invalidity of the Act and regulations. The only head of Commonwealth power
that the defendants relied on was section 51(vi). With two dissents, the High
Court upheld the Act and regulations.
The majority were impressed by three major factors: first, the extent of
the world international crisis;" 7 second, the fact that, in modern twentieth
century warfare, it was standard practice for belligerent nations to impose
strong monetary and capital controls in their war economies; 1 8 and third,
the reasons for refusal by the Treasurer were clearly related in their detail
to the imminent war emergency and, equally important, were fully available
for scrutiny."19 This, then, enabled the Court to evaluate objectively the
alleged link between the impugned federal measure (the Treasurer's refusal)
and a head of constitutional power, in this case section 51(vi). This third
factor, the court's ability to scrutinize the reasons for the Commonwealth's

112 E.g., id. at 192, 196.
113 E.g., supra note 111.

E.g., supranote 22, at 193-94.
"15 Supra note 107.
116 (No. 20 of 1951, Aust.).
117
E.g., supra note 115, at 219-20, 248.
118 This factor was of great importance particularly to Dixon CJ.: see id. at
216-19.
"19 E.g., id. at 256-57.
"14
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allegedly unconstitutional activity, was the great distinguishing factor,
in the
120
eyes of the majority, between CapitalIssues and Communist Party.
From these two decisions, it is reasonably clear that the Australian
defence power's "secondary aspect" will indeed sanction, in time of grave
international unrest short of war, some preparatory federal measures that
normally lie within state jurisdictions. Just how far section 51 (vi) may be
extended is debatable since so much will depend on the court's opinion of
the gravity of the potential crisis.-" Although one commentator on the
Communist Party and Capital Issues decisions somewhat facetiously suggested that the two cases merely demonstrated that raising money is less
important than liberty of opinion,12 2 this is, it is suggested, a fairly good
criterion on which to work. If the secondary aspect of the Australian defence
power is to operate not merely in times of outright war, why not state that
its application to restrict liberty of opinion (normally a matter largely reserved
to the Australian states) should only be in times of general war? Why not state
that the power's operation, in times of military danger short of war, should
encompass only necessary preparatory legislation of an economic and material
kind? The latter limitation is not without its own problems; for example,
should an imminent world crisis enable the federal authorities to assume
control of mineral or other natural resources situated within a state, if that
resource happens to possess strategic propensities? Like Canada, the ownership and management of natural resources located within Australian state
boundaries are reserved to the states. Unlike Canada, the Australian parliament possesses no equivalent of the declaratory power of the Canadian
parliament in section 92(10)(c) of the B.N.A. Act. 23 The answer would
almost certainly depend on the High Court's judgment of the seriousness of
the impending military crisis alleged by the Commonwealth, and that raises
a very fundamental question: whether a court is properly equipped, or is indeed the appropriate
forum, for deciding such potentially delicate questions
24
of high policy.1
VII. EMERGENCIES IN PEACE-TIME
The categories of emergencies, like those of negligence, are never closed.
In times of unsettled economies and unsettled social structures and values, it is

120 E.g., id. at 215-16,

252-53.
See Anderson, Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth (1948-51),
1 U. of Queensland L.J (No. 3) 34, at 43.
122 Sawer, supra note 29, at 223.
122 The constitutional ability of the Canadian parliament to assume responsibility
for regulating the Canadian uranium industry probably rests, in part, on declaratory
power, as well as on the federal general power in its "national dimensions" aspect: see
the Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-9, s. 18; and Pronto Uranium Mines
v. O.L.R.B., [1956] O.R. 862 at 867-70, 5 D.L.R. (2d) 342 at 347-49, 56 C.L.L.C.
15,293.
124 The dissent of Latham C.J. in the Communist Party case, supra note 22, is
based, in part, on the understandable proposition that a court is exceedingly ill-equipped
to assess the often secret and sensitive information on which governments will often
base their emergency decisions relating to national defence: see supra note 22, at 142-45.
121
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a naive government or parliament that thinks that the only emergencies it
will have to confront are military ones. This penultimate section of the paper
thus deals with the constitutional capacity of the Australian and Canadian
federal parliaments to cope with what might be loosely termed "peace-time"
emergencies that have no necessary relationship to an existing state of war or
military crisis.
There can be little doubt that, of the two federations, Canada is better
equipped constitutionally for the federal handling of peace-time emergencies.
This is because the Australian constitution does not contain a federal general
power analogous to that in the preamble to section 91 of the B.N.A. Act.
Although there may be fierce debate in Canada as to whether the general
power should be restricted to matters of national emergency, or should embrace matters normally of provincial concern which have attained a "national dimension," it is now clearly established that the power embraces
125
non-war emergencies. Prior to the decision in the Anti-Inflation Reference,
the "emergency" aspect of the general power had only ever been successfully
invoked in war-related cases, but the Canadian courts and the Privy Council
had never categorically limited "emergency" under section 91 to war-related
emergencies. Even at high-water periods of the Privy Council's pro-provincial,
anti-federal decision-making, their lordships never precluded the possibility
that "emergency" under section 91 might embrace non-war related crises in
the national life. 2 6 Thus, validity of the federal legislation in Toronto Electric Commissionersv. Snider'2 7 was denied because, inter alia, the legislation
was not temporary and exhibited no signs of being passed to meet a crisis
situation. 28 Likewise, in the Unemployment Insurance reference'29 of 1937,
the Privy Council rejected the federal unemployment insurance scheme at
least partially because (a) they probably did not consider the financial
difficulties of Canada during the Great Depression to be sufficiently an
emergency, 2 0 but also because (b) the legislation again exhibited none of
those "temporary palliative" tendencies that the Board thought should
characterize true emergency laws. 31 1
The Supreme Court decision in the Anti-Inflation Reference, however,
has opened up possibilities of federal intervention in all sorts of non-military
aspects of the national life, notwithstanding section 92 of the B.N.A. Act,
under the colour of "emergency". The Anti-Inflation Reference itself was a
dramatic enough example of federal action in previously constitutionally-

12 5 Supra note 16.
120

E.g., Toronto Electric Comm'rs v. Snider, supra note 67, at 412 (A.C.), 15

(D.L.R.).
127 Id.
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129

Id. at 414-16 (A.C.), 17-18 (D.L.R.).
A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 355, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684, [1937] 1 W.W.R.

312.
Id. at 365-66 (A.C.), 686 (D.L.R.), 315 (W.W.R.).
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doubtful fields-wide-ranging wage and price controls in broad areas of
federal and provincial concern-but the potential for federally-declared
emergencies having no relation to an existing war must be now greatly expanded. In 1974, for example, the Canadian parliament enacted the Energy
Supplies Emergency Act. 132 This statute, which was in force only till 1976,
was designed to meet the possibilities of drastic oil shortages following OPEC
boycotts and production cutbacks consequent upon the Yom Kippur War of
1973. This Act basically allowed the Governor-General in Council to declare
an emergency in the oil-supply situation in Canada, and consequently, to
institute the most thorough controls of oil distribution, including rationing
and the mandatory supply of set quotas to various regions of the country.
Such a scheme clearly envisaged the regulation of petroleum supplies right
down to the most provincial and local of levels. There may have been some
doubt whether such a scheme would have been constitutionally sustainable
under, inter alia, section 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act-"the regulation of trade
and cqmmerce"'-but the Act clearly drew upon the concept of an oilsupply "emergency,"
and thus relied on the emergency aspect of the federal
general power.13 4
The constitutional success of the federal parliament's (albeit temporary)
wage and price controls in the Anti-Inflation Reference has probably given
the federal government of Canada new heart that it may equally successfully
control other aspects of the national life under the emergency doctrine. This
is evinced by the federal enactment of a permanent Energy Supplies Emergency Act in 1979.125 None of the foregoing is to suggest that the Canadian
government and parliament would mala fides set out to grab large slices of
provincial social and economic jurisdiction under cover of a "colourable"
emergency. Some of the matters previously discussed may well be appropriate
subjects for federal action. Yet the great latitude allowed by the Supreme
Court to the federal parliament in asserting an emergency's existence must
cause some concern to ardent provincialists. 36
The Australian position would undoubtedly be lauded by provincialists:
the absence of a general power in section 51 of the Australian constitution
largely denies the Australian federal parliament the power to take national
"emergency" action in times of peace-time crisis unless, of course, the crisis
occurs in an area of Commonwealth responsibility under the constitution.
Australia too has had its constitutional dalliance with federal wage and price
controls, which, as in Canada, are normally beyond federal competence. In
1973, when inflation was causing the Australian federal government grave
concern, it wanted to implement federal wage and price controls. Since there
was no general power in section 51 to which the Australian government could
132 S.C. 1973-74, c. 52 as am.
33
1
See Marx, The Energy Crisis and the Emergency Power in Canada (1975), 2
Dal. L.J. 446 at 447-48.
134 d. at 448-50.
-15S.C. 1978-79, c. 17.
136 See, e.g., Patenaude, The Anti-Inflation Case: The shutters are closed but the
back door is wide open (1977), 15 "Osgoode Hall L.J. 397.
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resort, it had to try to amend the constitution,'1 37 by national referendum, to
add wages and prices to the list of federal powers in section 51. The referendum failed; wage and price controls stayed beyond the grasp of the federals.
Section 51 (vi) is, of course, useless in this kind of situation. As has been
shown, that provision permits the Commonwealth almost complete economic
control in times of war-related emergency, but it is of no avail in peace-time.
An Australian federal equivalent of the Canadian Energy Supplies Emergency Act would definitely be constitutionally vulnerable. 138 The Act might
be partially sustainable under the Commonwealth's power over interstate and
overseas trade and commerce, 139 but only partially, because of the extensive
regulation of intrastate trade and commerce that would be involved. The
highly strategic nature of oil in both war and peace suggests that a "mix" of
the Commonwealth's trade and commerce and defence powers might support
such a statute in Australia, but the question is very doubtful and would
clearly lead, if litigated, to great agonizings in the High Court over the scope
of the defence power's "secondary aspect" in time of peace.
The problem is that the High Court has never given any general recognition to the concept that a matter of "national dimension" should, for that
reason alone, be allocated to the federal parliament. There is no implied
federal general power in the Australian constitution except to an extremely
limited, and as yet vaguely formulated, extent. The 1975 High Court decision in Victoria v. The Commonwealth and Hayden'40 is the most recent,
and indeed virtually the only, occasion on which the court has given some
attention to the idea of a "national dimensions" doctrine for the Australian
constitution. The case concerned an attack upon the validity of a federal
Appropriations Act' 4' which sanctioned spending federal monies upon a
number of federal social welfare purposes, some of which were intra vires
the constitution, some of which were not. The challenge failed for reasons
not germane to this paper, but several judges took the opportunity to consider
the argument that if a problem is of nationwide importance, but does not
fall within the Commonwealth list of powers in section 51, then it ought to be
a Commonwealth responsibility anyway.
Barwick C.J. and Gibbs J. specifically rejected this argument: 42 "the
growth of the Commonwealth to nationhood did not have the effect of destroying the distribution of powers carefully effected by the Constitution."'- 43
Barwick C.J., along with Mason and Jacobs JJ., also recognized, however,
that certain implied powers did inhere to the Commonwealth because of the

137 Unlike the B.N.A. Act, the Australian constitution can be amended locally by
means of a process involving, inter alia, a national referendum: see Australian constitution, s. 128.
138At the time of writing (February 1980), there is no equivalent Act on the
Australian federal statute books.
139 Australian constitution, s. 51(i).
140 Supra note 24.
141 (No. 1 of 1974, Aust.).
142 Supra note 140, at 362, 364, 378 (C.L.R.), 165, 171 (A.LJ.R.).
143 Id. at 378 (C.L.R.), 171 (A.L.J.R.).
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latter's status as a fully sovereign national government; that is, the very status
of nationhood did, by itself, attract to the Commonwealth certain powers not
mentioned in section 51 or elsewhere.144 The judges mentioned several examples of such implied powers: the power of the Commonwealth to engage in
geographical exploration, 145 scientific research 146 and to conduct national
enquiries and surveys for information-gathering purposes.' 47 But generally,
the judges who considered this matter preferred not to define closely the nature
or extent of this implied "national" power; they preferred to await the uncircumstances, so that the
folding of time and changes in conditions and
14
further nature of this power might be revealed. 8
These dicta are hardly illuminating. They reveal competing desires: a
desire not to do radical violence to the constitution's division of powers, but
also a wish not entirely to preclude the probability, or possibility, that the
developing national interest might require the judicial invention of appropriate
federal powers for special, as yet unheralded, problems. Might not the future
intervention of some great economic crisis of disastrous proportions, or a
major natural disaster, call forth judicial approval of a possible Australian
federal peace-time emergency power? Only time will tell, but the seeds of such
a future possible development may lie in those guarded comments of Barwick
C.J., Mason and Jacobs JJ. in Victoria v. The Commonwealth and Hayden.
VIIL CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN POLICING
EMERGENCIES IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA
In such manner, then, have the Australian and Canadian courts succeeded in fashioning, from their respective constitutional instruments, a highly
effective emergency power for use by their respective national governments
and parliaments in war-time and war-related emergencies. At the level of
military crisis, it has been shown that the Australian defence power in section
51 (vi) of the constitution has matched, in content and scope, the Canadian
war-emergency power constructed out of the Delphic preamble to section 91
144 There is one other implied "national power" that the Australian High Court has,
for many years prior to Vict. v. Cth. and Hayden, recognized as belonging to the
Commonwealth in virtue of its status as a sovereign, national government: the so-called
"internal security power", by which the Commonwealth can legislate to protect its instrumentalities, officers, and property (indeed its own continued existence as a constitutional polity), from internal attack, subversion, or criminal activity. See R. v. Kidinan
(1915), 20 C.L.R. 425, 21 A.L.R. 405 (H.C. of Aust.); Burns v. Ransley (1949), 79
C.L.R. 101, [1949] A.L.R. 817, 23 A.L.J. 441 (H.C. of Aust.); and R. v. Sharkey
(1949), 79 C.L.R. 121 (H.C. of Aust.). However, the Commonwealth cannot intervene
in an Australian state that is threatened by internal civil violence unless that state requests federal assistance: see Australian constitution, s. 119; and see also R. v. Sharkey,
op. cit., at 151. Several Australian states possess their own local "emergency powers"type legislation: for a bizarre illustration of the Queensland law in action, see Dean v.
A.G. of Qld., [1971] Qld. R. 391 (S.C. of Qld.). The federal internal security power
was argued by the Commonwealth in the Communist Party case, supra note 22, but this
was rejected by the majority of the Court.
145 Supra note 140, at 362, 413 (C.L.R.), 165, 184 (A.LJ.R.).
146Id. at 362, 397, 413 (C.L.R.), 165, 178, 184 (A.L.J.R.).
147
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of the B.N.A. Act. Different constitutional texts have resulted in almost
identical federal powers in both countries. When departure is made from the
field of military emergency, however, the constitutional positions in the two
countries have differed: section 91 of the B.N.A. Act gives the Canadian
parliament a potentially massive power of control of peace-time emergency
situations, whereas section 51(vi) of the Australian constitution is most
unlikely to give the Commonwealth a power to intervene in non-war-related
national crises.
The major problem for the judiciary in both countries has been that the
concept of emergency involves a temporary shift in the constitutional division
of powers, with the federal authority taking over many significant areas of
provincial or state authority. The Canadian and Australian judiciary are the
ultimate arbiters of that constitutional allocation of powers; therefore, they
must police that division of responsibility, and yet not present insuperable
obstacles to bona fide federal action-intended to cope with some species of
extreme threat to the national body politic. 149 How have the courts trodden
that delicate and difficult line? As a general statement, it may be said that
the Canadian courts have, rightly or wrongly, adopted something less of the
"constitutional policeman" role in emergency times, than have the Australian
courts.

It has been said, both in relation to Australia and Canada, that in constitutional litigation there is a prima facie presumption in favour of the
validity of impugned federal legislation, particularly emergency legislation. 150
Thus, two separate issues have arisen: first, how conclusive is the parliament's assertion of the existence of an emergency, in the eyes of the courts;
and second, do the courts question the efficacy of measures adopted by parliament to combat the emergency?
It is going too far to uphold the view, as Mr. Justice Brossard once did in
the Quebec Court of Appeal, that a court would be without power to question the factual basis of a proclaimed state of emergency. 15 1 Brossard J.A.
was dealing with the now-famous proclamation of a state of emergency under
the Canadian War Measures Act during the "October crisis" in Quebec, in
1970. The higher appellate courts of Canada have, on the contrary, stated
that a court may indeed question the alleged foundation of a state of emergency, whether under the War Measures Act or some other competent statute,
but that the evidence warranting a denial of emergency must be very clear
149 R. v. Foster, supra note 88, at 83.
1
60 In Canada, this statement-after cases such as Fort Frances,Japanese-Canadians,
Wartime Leasehold Regulations, and Anti-Inflation-is almost certainly true: see Laskin,
"Peace, Order and Good Government" Re-Examined (1947), 25 Can. B. Rev. 1054, at
1082-83; and Belobaba, Disputed "Emergencies" and the Scope of Judicial Review

(1977), 15 Osgoode Hall L.. 406 at 414-15. However, the statement in relation to
Australia, although often made-see Wynes, supra note 21, at 35 and the cases cited
therein-is not entirely accurate, since judicial dicta in the Australian High Court can
be cited in support of a contrary position: e.g., the Communist Party case, supra note
22, at 255, 263, 275-76; and the Capital Issues case, supra note 107, at 247.

151 Gagnon and Vallires v. Reg., supra note 105, at 348.
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and compelling. 152 Where, of course, the "emergency" is constituted by a great
war whose existence is a matter of public notoriety and judicial notice, the
question of clear and compelling rebuttal evidence would be merely academic.
As has been shown, both the Australian and Canadian courts have
largely (and rightly, it may be said) acquiesced in their respective federal
parliaments' claiming and asserting sweeping powers on the outbreak of
major war. When the question has been the extent of the federal parliament's
transitional powers at war's end, however, the High Court of Australia, while
recognizing the federal parliament's interest in securing an orderly transition
to peace, has been prepared to reject federal attempts to continue temporarily
war-time controls. 153 On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court,
while recognizing its theoretical right to not accept the federal government's
judgment of the situation, nevertheless has not questioned the Canadian
government's considered judgment1 54that transitional conditions required the
continuation of war-time controls.
Likewise, in the sphere of federal governmental assertion of emergency
in the absence of general war conditions, a change of approach has been
noticed as between the Canadian Supreme Court and the Australian High
Court. In the Anti-Inflation Reference, where the Canadian parliament asserted
the existence of an inflationary situation of "serious national concern," the
case seems to have been conducted on the basis that "absence of emergency"
had to be proved by those attacking the law. Whether the basis of proof be
the "no rational basis" of Laskin C.J.C., Judson, Spence, and Dickson JJ.,16
or the "very clear evidence" basis of Ritchie, Martland, and Pigeon JJ.,150 a
presumption of constitutionality seemed to operate in favour of the Crownand this in a case where the very existence of the emergency was quite
strongly disputed.' 57 However, in Australia, in the two major cases concerning
152 This mis-interpretation of the Canadian cases by Mr. Justice Brossard is succinctly corrected by Marx, The "Apprehended Insurrection" of October 1970 and the
Judicial Function (1972), 7 U.B.C. L. Rev. 55 at 56-59. It is possible that Brossard J.A.
was influenced unduly by the language of s. 2 of the War Measures Act, which states
that a proclamation by the Governor in Council shall be "conclusive evidence" that
there is in existence a state of war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended. Of
course, the language of s. 2 cannot prevail against the authoratitive pronouncements
of the Supreme Court that, constitutionally, a litigant opposing the government use of
emergency powers has the option (albeit an extraordinarily difficult one) of attempting
to disprove the existence in fact of the emergency. See Marx, op. cit., and the cases
cited therein.
153 E.g., R. v. Foster, supra note 88.
154 The Wartime Leasehold Regulations reference, supra note 39. Of course, the
difference between the Australian approach in R. v. Foster and the Canadian approach
in Wartime Leasehold bespeaks more than a simple difference in the two courts' respective approaches to very similar facts; the Australian approach virtually places the onus
of proving validity on the federal government, which is practically the reverse of the
Canadian approach in Wartime Leasehold: also see Marx, supra note 2, at 63.
155.Anti-Inflation Reference, supra note 16, at 423, 425 (S.C.R.), 496, 497-98

(D.L.R.) 587, 589 (N.R.).
156 Id. at 439 (S.C.R.), 509 (D.L.R.), 601 (N.R.).
57

A feature that at least one observer regarded as unprecedented and thus doubtful: See Belobaba, supra note 150, at 414-15.
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federal legislation preparing the country for possible war emergencies, 158 the
High Court clearly conducted both hearings on the basis that the defendant
Commonwealth must establish constitutionality. 159
Similarly, in both countries, it has been an article of judicial faith that
the courts are never concerned with the wisdom, propriety, or efficacy of
an impugned federal emergency measure. 160 The courts do not ask "Will the
law actually help cope with the emergency?" but rather "Is it within power?"
Again, the Australian High Court, while never formally deviating from this
orthodox abdication, has modified it significantly. Ever since Farey v.
Burvett,'0 ' the Court has demanded that it be satisfied not that the Commonwealth law actually aids defence, but that the law exhibits some degree of
capability to assist defence.' 62 While, as has been demonstrated, the High
Court has liberally recognized such "capability" in times of general war, and
once in a time of apprehended war, nevertheless, the Court, even in times
of outright general war, has sometimes struck down federal laws because they
showed no apparent "capability" to assist defence.les
Thus, it may be said that the Australian courts have been more rigourous
in their willingness to challenge federal claims of "emergency" as justifying
intrusion into state areas of concern. The Canadian courts, on the other hand,
have been clearly more accommodating to similar federal actions in Canada.
This is not to say that one approach is more right or admirable than the
other; it is merely a recognition that, when dealing with the concept of
emergency in a federation, one is faced with a dilemma: ought privacy be
given to the constitutionally-enshrined balance of power, or ought the central
government be allowed an effective, if far-reaching, hand in dealing with
national crises? Why the Australian courts should have leaned slightly more
in favour of the former, and the Canadian courts more in favour of the latter,
is impossible to say.' 64 It does illustrate the tension that will forever occur
between the "divided jurisdictions" principle of federalism and the "central
action means efficient action" principle of emergency.

158 Australian Communist Party v. Cth., supra note 22; the Capital Issues case,
supra note 107.
1 59
See the references to the Communist Party and Capital Issues cases in note 150,
supra.
160 In Canada, see the Japanese-Canadianscase, supra note 39, at 101 -(A.C.), 585
(D.L.R.) and the Anti-Inflation Reference, supra note 16, at 424-25 (S.C.R.), 497
(D.L.R.) 255, 262; and the Capital Issues case, supra note 107, at 219, 240, 256.
181 Supra note 40.
162
See note 58 and the Australian references in note 160, supra.
163 See notes 59, 60, 61, supra, and the references therein.
.164 Perhaps there is one factor which should not be entirely discounted: the fact
that the High Court of Australia, like the U.S. Supreme Court but unlike the Supreme
Court of Canada, is established by, and is therefore entrenched in, the federal constitution. This may make it not less chary of incurring federal parliamentary displeasure
by holding the latter's statutes invalid, but more sensitive to its role as ultimate guardian
of the federal system.

